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CHAPTER 10 
The Emergence of Peace Studies  
in Chinese Higher Education 
ALAN HUNTER 
SUMMARY This chapter focuses on three main issues: the relevance of 
peace studies to the new super-power, China; the changing roles of the 
higher education sector there; and academic links between the United 
Kingdom and China, viewed through the specific case study of a higher 
education links programme which brought together Coventry and Nanjing 
universities. A theme running throughout is an exploration of the limits to 
intellectual flexibility in Chinese academia. Can the system now tolerate 
discussion even of controversial topics like pacifism and non-violent 
protest, which appear to directly challenge important state values such as 
the right to self-defence? The chapter argues that universities have largely 
outgrown the dogmatism of earlier generations. Moreover, China itself has a 
rich heritage of pro-peace thought, and Chinese leaders appear to be 
committed to non-violent resolution of conflicts wherever possible. It 
would be desirable if Western ones were to follow their lead. 
Introduction 
In 2000, the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry 
University initiated research links with faculty members of the History 
Department of Nanjing University, one of the leading universities of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). From 2002 to 2005, the partnership 
received financial assistance from the British Council under its Higher 
Education Links (HEL) Programme. A high point of the cooperation was 
an International Conference on Peace Studies held in Nanjing in March 
2005, the first of its kind in China; collaborative work continues up to 
the time of writing. This chapter addresses several key questions: first, 
the nature of Peace Studies and why the discipline is relevant to the 
PRC. Then, what is the relationship between Peace Studies, academic 
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institutions, and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with 
particular reference to China? What lessons have we learned about 
academic partnership work with China through this link? 
Educated awareness of approaches to peace and conflict in different 
cultures is now essential. I am sure that the United Kingdom (UK) and 
US public would have been better served if, for example, our politicians 
had known more about conflict resolution in West Asia before embarking 
on military adventures there. It is quite reasonable to suggest that the 
Chinese should learn more about international pro-peace discourse, the 
theory and history of peaceful politics, the heritage of Gandhi, King, and 
Tutu for example. There is, perhaps, an even more urgent need for non-
Chinese to gain a deeper and more respectful understanding of the 
Chinese cultural heritage. There are practical reasons for doing so. It is 
almost certain that in the twenty-first century, a much larger proportion 
of political and economic power will devolve to Asian countries – India, 
China, Japan, Korea and others – so, inevitably, Asian modes of 
discourse and practice will permeate international organisations. 
Specifically within Higher Education (HE), a large proportion of the 
world’s engineers and scientists will receive their education in Asia, 
many of them in the PRC. Negotiations about trade, the environment and 
military issues will be increasingly conducted in a more cosmopolitan 
language, not comfortably couched in the dominant end-of-history 
Atlantic dialect. This reference to language and dialect points not only to 
the rapidly expanding use of Mandarin Chinese as lingua franca in parts 
of Asia, but also to the fact that Western modes of organisational 
behaviour are only a subset of global practice. Relations between state 
and citizen, lawmaker and business person, ‘ally’ and ‘enemy’ may take 
on various shades of colour in different streets of the global village. As 
we walk around, we need to learn and adapt. 
The need to put an end to international warfare is hopefully self-
evident to most people. Apart from avoiding direct military casualties, 
another important reason to promote peace is that armed conflict almost 
invariably leads to complex poverty and other development failures; in 
other words, it is a major constraint on the achievement of MDGs. It is 
difficult to implement successful poverty reduction programmes in 
societies suffering protracted social conflicts; while conversely, a 
peaceful environment is needed for sustainable economic growth and 
more equitable resource allocation. In the past decade, agencies have 
become increasingly alert to the fact that aid or development 
programmes need to be sensitive to rivalries and competing claims: 
delivery programmes can be hijacked, by paramilitaries for example, and 
can even prolong conflicts by introducing new resources or reinforcing 
old dependencies. 
Historically, power transitions are dangerous. All the indications 
are that the early decades of the twenty-first century will be a period of 
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rapid, unpredictable change. There is the evident shift of economic 
power from the Atlantic to the Pacific, to use a water metaphor, and 
there are also transitions from carbon fuel to whatever replaces it, from 
print and terrestrial TV to new media, perhaps from relatively stable to 
unstable patterns of climate change and migration. China as the major 
rising power, with all its creative potential and also its internal and 
external stresses, is consciously concerned with maintaining a peaceful 
international and domestic environment. Its leaders do turn to think-
tanks and the university sector to provide analysis of how to achieve a 
‘peaceful rising’. Yet the Chinese government is also committed to 
maintaining a strong nuclear and conventional military deterrent, and to 
containing social protest. Discussions of peace and conflict, the rights 
and wrongs of armed state power, are highly relevant to contemporary 
Chinese society (Hunter & Liu, 2007). 
My paper starts by defining Peace Studies, and proceeds to discuss 
in more detail the current Chinese context in which debates on peace 
and conflict take place. I then consider some correlations between 
conflict issues and the Millennium Development Goals, again with 
reference to China and its Higher Education sector. The paper concludes 
with an analysis of our link with Nanjing, and the lessons we draw from 
it. 
What is Peace Studies? 
‘Peace Studies’ as a recognised discipline in Western academia dates 
back to the 1960s, when it was stimulated by the reaction on US 
campuses to the Vietnam war. By then, there was already a small body of 
theoretical and empirical research into issues related to peace, conflict 
and violence; most scholars regard the Norwegian sociologist Johan 
Galtung as a key founder of such research in the late 1950s in Oslo, as 
can be seen from collections of his early writings (Galtung, 1975, 1996). 
Yet it is considered by some to be a maverick discipline. First, Peace 
Studies academics have in several countries a long, and many consider 
honourable, commitment to grass-roots activism, frequently in 
opposition to government policies. Most peace researchers regard ‘peace’ 
as a social good, and they hope their academic work contributes to peace 
rather than violence; they draw the analogy of health studies or medical 
science, where the aim is improvement of health and eradication of 
disease, simultaneously a value-laden and scientific undertaking 
(Galtung, 2006, p. 19). But this normative orientation does lead to the 
critique that Peace Studies is political activism masquerading as a 
legitimate academic pursuit (Cox & Scruton, 1984). In 2004, for example, 
conservative US journalists accused Peace Studies professors of being 
pro-terrorist because many of them argued against the invasion of Iraq 
(Rank, 2006, p. 123). Second, at its most idealistic, it aims at ending or 
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curtailing war; or at least questions war’s inevitability. To politicians or 
social scientists who believe that war is inevitable, probably sometimes 
healthy and necessary, such aspirations may seem ludicrous. Galtung’s 
response has been that Peace Studies is ‘biased’ against war and seeks its 
abolition, and that there is ‘nothing arcane or inane about that; it is the 
same as the abolition of slavery and colonialism ... The abolition of war 
as a social institution means to deprive the state of its prerogative to 
wage wars, and the state does not like it’ (Rank, 2006, p. 124). 
Some twenty years back, a consultative group within the 
Consortium on Peace Research Education and Development 
(based in Washington State), asked to define and where 
necessary delimit Peace Studies, arrived at the following 
description of its basic characteristics: 
 
– Central propositions. 1) The traditional belief in the 
inevitability of war and injustice is questioned, based on data 
and insights from peace research and movements for social 
change; 2) The pedagogical purpose of Peace Studies is to 
provide students with appropriate intellectual tools with 
which to examine this traditional belief and inquire into 
possible alternatives to war and oppression. 
– Fundamental core. 1) The central questions Peace Studies 
asks are: What is the nature of peace? What are the conditions 
that make peace possible? How are these conditions achieved? 
2) The minimum areas of concern are: organised lethal 
violence among social groups at all levels of organisation (war) 
and structural violence (systemic discrimination, deprivation, 
and oppression). 3) The basic values of Peace Studies are a 
world-wide human perspective, desirability of achieving peace 
and justice, and recognition of the possibility of their 
achievement. (Rank, 2006, p. 119) 
In the same period, Stephenson suggested that Peace Studies is 
distinguished from more conventional disciplines, for example 
international relations, by three key characteristics: it is global rather 
than state-centric; it considers all levels of interaction, from the 
interpersonal to the international; it is value based and action oriented, 
and prescriptive in terms of alternatives to violence (Stephenson, 1989, 
p. 12). 
Despite objections noted above, Peace Studies is now firmly 
entrenched in academia, and many of its approaches are today adopted 
in mainstream diplomacy, aid and development projects, and even in 
military thinking. Issues like conflict sensitivity in aid work; conflict 
resolution skills; conflict analysis; reconciliation in post-conflict zones; 
non-violent political movements; peace-building deployments; civilian 
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witness are all on the working agendas of governmental agencies, despite 
their arguable origins in the thoughts of flaky idealists. Internationally, 
the greatest number of Peace Studies programmes in any one country is 
in the USA, but there are also important programmes in Australia, Japan, 
South Africa and the UK among others; my recent book (Hunter, 2006) 
provides a recent overview of the discipline from international 
perspectives. Peace Studies has started in the PRC, but faces obstacles to 
which I return in a later section of this chapter. 
There have been many theoretical and practical attempts in the past 
decade to integrate diverse strands of developmental thinking, many of 
them documented in publications from the UN’s development agencies 
(United Nations Development Programme, 1990-). The formulation of the 
MDGs has been influential, although atypical in its avoidance of 
reference to armed conflict. Initiatives with similar agendas but slightly 
different approaches, all of which include conflict reduction among 
goals, include the Commission for Africa Report (Commission for Africa, 
2005); the human security agenda formulated by, among others, Amartya 
Sen (Newman & Richmond, 2001; United Nations Commission on 
Human Security, 2003); and the work of specialists in Germany (Brauch, 
2005) and Mexico (Oswald, 2006) who have developed paradigms of 
comprehensive or integrated security, focusing on the multiple needs of 
vulnerable populations. Many of these broad human security studies 
trace their origins back to the ‘basic needs’ paradigm that was influential 
in development studies from the 1970s: new challenges that need to be 
integrated in an updated paradigm include climate change, 
environmental degradation, sub-state violence, ethnic cleansing and 
human trafficking. 
The Human Security Report 2005 (Mack & Nielsen, 2006) surprised 
many readers, not least peace researchers, by arguing that wars and 
human casualties resulting from direct armed conflict had actually 
decreased substantially between 1975 and 2005. The authors make the 
point that armed conflict makes populations extremely vulnerable, and 
that the sequelae of wars are often displacement, malnutrition and 
epidemics that do cause vast human misery and poverty. The news in 
summer 2006 reported a similar story: the Israeli bombing of Lebanon 
had by early August inflicted one thousand human fatalities, mostly 
civilians. But there were an estimated million displaced persons lacking 
food and basic medical care, and the country’s infrastructure and 
economy had been set back several decades. Although it may be difficult 
to quantify the linkages between violent conflict and poverty, it seems 
indisputable that, despite the overall reduction in international wars, 
armed conflicts are still the major contributory factor in many instances 
of extreme poverty. It requires no great theoretical acumen to discern that 
the promotion of peace, especially in volatile and potentially violent 
situations, is an essential component of a sustainable development 
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package. A simple theoretical model would demonstrate an overall 
negative correlation between violent conflict and poverty reduction, 
although a few exceptions might be found – successful war-faring 
nations with large munitions industries, for example. 
The Chinese Context 
In 2008, China hosted the Beijing Olympics. This event was celebrated 
with maximum media impact, as the Chinese leadership intended to 
highlight the international recognition of China as a leading world 
power. Economically, China quadrupled its gross domestic product 
(GDP) between 1980 and 2000, lifting perhaps 100 million people out of 
poverty; surely one of the great economic achievements in world history. 
It plans to quadruple GDP again between 2000 and 2020; if successful it 
will then rank as probably the second economic power in the world after 
the USA. 
Opinions differ as to whether this rise will be a sustainable and 
positive phenomenon. Some writers stress negative features of the 
economy, government and social system, believing that China’s new-
found power makes it an unstable and fundamentally flawed nation-
state. Among problems they highlight are an ambitious but outmoded 
and corrupt form of government by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); 
massive if hidden unemployment that is only tolerable because of the 
short-term boom; and unsustainable predation of the environment. 
Terrill, for example, presumes that the Beijing government wants a 
dominant role in Asia, similar to that of the USA in Latin America. 
However his overall assessment is that the CCP will be simply incapable 
of fulfilling its ambitions, so China will become a vindictive, frustrated 
power (Terrill, 2003). Other writers are much more optimistic, and point 
out that so far China’s ascendancy has been remarkably successful. 
Shenkar for example believes that we are witnessing the dramatic growth 
of a future world power, with excellent resources at home, and the 
international financial and technological clout of a sophisticated 
Diaspora (Shenkar, 2004). 
As strategic thinkers, China’s current generation of leaders are 
planning their country’s future position in the world politically, 
culturally and militarily as well as in terms of GDP. All the indications 
are that they want increasingly to present themselves to the world as a 
peace-loving, reasonable and non-threatening super-power, one that is 
more accommodating and sensitive to smaller nations than the USA. At 
the same time, they are aware that the very rapid social transition 
currently underway in China could easily lead to violent internal 
disturbances that might threaten their growing national prosperity and 
stable rule (Hunter & Liu, 2007). 
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In general, Chinese leaders appear to be committed to peaceful 
development, although I would certainly not mistake this for a 
commitment to pacifism. Indeed China does stress the importance of 
conventional and nuclear military power for both a general and a 
particular reason. The general reason is to enhance its status as world 
power, alert to the complexity of Asian, particularly East Asian, 
international politics with flashpoints in the East and South China Seas, 
the Korean peninsula and elsewhere. The particular issue is the 60-year 
stand-off with Taiwan, in which the PRC always needs, it believes, to 
maintain a highly credible immediate military preparedness. 
A question signposted in the Introduction is: why is the study of 
peace important in the Chinese context? I believe the CCP leadership 
has, since 1978 at least, been concerned to maintain a peaceful 
environment both domestically and internationally during this period of 
economic progress. We should be grateful for it: the maintenance of 
stability in the PRC is a major contribution to stability in Asia and 
beyond. It is fair to infer that they wish to avoid international wars 
except in the most extreme circumstances. I think the Chinese political 
leadership will stress peaceful initiatives in several areas, firstly in 
domestic issues: 
1. to assist in the peaceful transition from one-party rule to consultative 
or eventually multi-party politics; 
2. to assist in poverty reduction and social stability at local level by 
avoiding or reducing violent conflicts between competing groups; 
3. to negotiate solutions to potential conflicts between the state 
orthodoxy and non-state actors, especially religious groups and 
ethnic minorities; 
4. to assist in human rights protection, for example learning to handle 
demonstrations and protests without resort to military suppression. 
Secondly, as China becomes increasingly, and rapidly, a major world 
power, many international issues are sure to demand careful attention. 
On a pragmatic note, we could make a short list of cross-boundary 
priorities: 
1. to avoid international military conflict; 
2. to mitigate international conflicts over trade or other issues; 
3. to develop China’s role in ‘global citizenship’ including its input at 
the UN; 
4. to improve cooperation in areas like the control of illicit arms 
trading. 
I believe that any contribution made by academic researchers and 
writers, think-tanks and policy advisers that will assist in maintaining 
peace, or reducing tensions and managing conflict in all these areas, is to 
be greatly welcomed, whether addressing the public or politicians, and 
whether in or outside China. Is there a link – or indeed conflict – 
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between these two groups of issues, the domestic and the international? 
This question gives rise to some complex correlations. To take a negative 
example, it is a standard tactic of regimes with shrinking economies to 
stimulate nationalist fervour and divert popular anger onto an ‘enemy’ – 
which in China’s case could easily be Japan. If and when the current 
economic boom slows down, could a future Chinese leadership trade the 
risk of international conflict for social cohesion at home? Perhaps, but 
more positive scenarios are also possible, namely that lessons of conflict 
management learned in the domestic arena will be very useful when 
China becomes more actively integrated in international affairs. 
I hope that we, non-Chinese, can highlight one other aspect, namely 
the international sharing of cultural resources. We do indeed have our 
‘peace’ heroes and icons outside China, but there are gems in the Chinese 
tradition to which we are, most likely, profoundly blind. Indeed, the 
formative period of Chinese philosophy coincided with the numerous 
political upheavals that characterised the Warring States era (about 500 
to 300 BCE). The ideal of a more peaceful society became central to 
almost all philosophies; disagreements were less about the need for 
peace, which was seen as self-evident, more often about how to achieve 
it. Confucians stressed strict adherence to both tradition and inner 
morality; Daoists searched for harmony within natural cosmic order; 
other schools advocated universal disarmament and a mode of life based 
only on agriculture. Meanwhile the Legalists initiated a tradition of 
statecraft that still resonated two thousand years later: human beings 
could only be controlled by strict laws which a state power had to 
implement with ruthless zeal to avoid chaos (Ryden, 1998). 
Many Western readers may be familiar with concepts of peace, or 
arguments for and against war, which derive from Roman and early 
Christian thought. Chinese concepts are rooted in another civilisation; 
one in which, for example, water imagery is a key component and root 
metaphor of philosophy (Allan, 1997). Thus the character ‘ping’, used in 
many compounds to denote ‘peace’, signifies the flat, unruffled surface of 
a lake; pacification may be denoted as ‘yihun weiqing’, clarifying turbid 
waters. Perhaps a core Chinese vision, at times of tension, is of conflicted 
society as a turbulent and muddy whirlpool; effective leadership will 
make the people turn back towards a ruler who holds moral authority, 
reversing the flow towards the pure waters higher up the river... Other, 
non-hydraulic, collocations are the contrast between luan (turmoil) and 
zhi (order), while horticultural borrowings are also common: removing 
the weeds, for example, to allow beneficial crops to flourish. 
He (harmony) is another concept central to Chinese culture. Hejie is 
probably the closest in meaning to ‘reconciliation’ in English, conveying 
the idea of recovering good relationships between persons after quarrels. 
Hemu, friendship between persons or nations, refers to the ideal 
relationship in the community, so it can carry positive resonances, 
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perhaps similar to concord or amity; or, at a minimum, recognition of co-
existence. The collocation of the two ideograms he and ping is 
interesting. Heping, harmony and equality/tranquillity, generally used as 
the equivalent for the English ‘peace’, is a resonant word. When the order 
is reversed, pinghe refers to moral and personal qualities which suggest 
no conflicts in an individual’s inner world. Finally, heqi means showing 
a kind attitude towards others. The idea is that if a person holds a high 
position, is held in public esteem, or regarded as very intelligent and 
successful, he or she should still be calm and considerate to others, even 
when they oppose him or hold different ideas. 
For the past century or so, the Chinese have been obliged, alongside 
most of the rest of the world, to operate in an international environment 
whose discourse and praxis are heavily weighted to suit Anglo-
American, or arguably European, norms. These norms indeed have 
attractive and valuable features that in many respects could set a 
benchmark for future developments. Core values such as freedom of 
expression, legal safeguards for individuals and political representation 
through secret ballots can and are perhaps almost universally 
appreciated, if not practised. Nevertheless, some Asian commentators 
argue that ‘Asian values’, which tend to be more communitarian than the 
Western focus on individual autonomy, are also valuable. I am sure there 
are other normative procedures and modes of discourse that seem natural 
to Asians and perhaps alien to some Westerners, just as many Asians 
may feel alienated by what they perceive as Western arrogance and 
missionary zeal. Saul has shown convincingly the frustration felt by 
some Asian leaders at the perceived self-righteous moralising of Western 
spokespersons in debates on human security and, in particular, their 
right to intervene in other countries’ problems (Saul, 2006). 
Are we going to educate ourselves to the extent that we can 
converse with Chinese on their own terms, or at least meet them 
halfway? Or do we retain the habitual attitude that somehow they – 
along with Japanese, Koreans and many others – should adapt to our 
ways of thinking and doing? Will the rivers of culture merge, or meander 
along their own channels? This debate does raise an interesting point. In 
a possible ‘clash of civilisations’, or more hopefully a mutual enrichment 
of civilisations, what would peaceful cooperation look like? Would it be 
tolerance of diversity, respect for another’s cultural traditions? 
Compromise, to work out a middle ground of easy communication? Or 
robust debate and even confrontation to try and achieve a new synthesis? 
Incidentally, I hope the UK can be at the forefront of positive 
developments here, especially if we can overcome the current over-
riding concerns with security issues. One example of peaceful influence, 
for example, has been the interest shown by many thousands of UK 
residents in Eastern spirituality at a period when traditional church 
attendance has been rapidly declining. 
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Peace Studies, Millennium  
Development Goals and Chinese HE 
Poverty mitigation and conflict management need to be addressed by 
state agencies on the one hand, and by activist, grass-roots groups on the 
other. The remainder of this chapter considers what role there might be 
for Chinese Education Institutions (HEIs) in these areas. 
It is important to recognise the central role that Chinese HE may 
play in the next generation in Asia. Some recent reports have estimated 
that if current trends continue, 90% of all the world’s scientists and 
engineers could be Asian by the year 2010, and a rapidly growing 
proportion of them will be Chinese educated; although admittedly, it 
will still take time for China and other Asian countries to compete in 
certain sunrise technologies and cutting-edge research areas, as 
discussed in a 2006 submission to the US Congress (Wadhwa, 2006). 
Rapidly growing numbers of students from Korea, Vietnam and other 
Asian countries are choosing to study at Chinese universities; Chinese 
and PRC-educated young people will become increasingly influential in 
the media, design, medicine and other professions. 
At the risk of sounding hyperbolic, Chinese HEIs will have a 
profound impact on Asia – even on the whole world – in the next 
generation; it would therefore be extremely valuable if they are 
transmitters of pro-social values as well as technological expertise. It will 
not be an easy task. One challenge is that perhaps the great majority of 
young people, and their families, are primarily looking for a good start in 
professional life and career prospects, in which value education may be 
seen as irrelevant or distracting. Moreover, the PRC government has a 
mixed agenda: on the one hand it still preaches socialist values, despite 
cynicism from much of the population, while on the other it is resolutely 
anti-religious and to some extent suspicious of all non-Marxist 
ideologies. However, Chinese HEIs are also rooted in a civilisation which 
has emphasised moral values in its education process for more than two 
thousand years, and which even in the past 50 tried to combine technical 
schooling with value formation, even if the latter has often been a crude 
and confrontational form of Marxism. Hopefully there will be space in 
the process of Chinese HE expansion for consideration of peace as well 
as technology, recognising that technology without the wisdom to 
control it is more likely to lead to destruction than well-being. 
I attended a Chinese university in 1981, and have visited many of 
them regularly since then, thus witnessing, alongside the boom of the 
Chinese economy, an equally amazing transformation of Chinese 
intellectual and academic life (Lin & Galikowski, 1999). Several studies 
of Chinese HE in historical perspective trace developments from the 
birth of the modern sector in the early twentieth century to the first 
decades of the communist regime (Hartnett, 1998; Altbach & Umakoshi, 
2004). In the 1960s, Chinese universities were hit by a level of repression 
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almost unprecedented in any part of the world: during the Cultural 
Revolution they were closed down for a 10-year period, during which 
virtually the only education or indeed intellectual activity was mind-
numbing repetition of Maoist slogans. Many Chinese scholars are deeply 
resentful of, and embarrassed to talk about, this period which was a 
catastrophic loss in development opportunity. 
However, the new leadership under Deng Xiaoping rapidly re-
launched the sector, and by the early 1980s, Chinese campuses were 
again busy, and faculty were cautiously starting to rebuild links with 
Western universities (Pepper, 1984; Yang & Liu, 1988; Hayhoe, 1989). In 
the 1980s and even into the early 1990s, Chinese universities were 
typical of those in much of the communist world. Rigidly controlled by 
CCP policies, the universities’ role was to produce the next generation of 
cadres to serve in political and economic administration, and in the 
development of science and technology. At the same time, limited, 
though vital, space was given to the preservation of China’s heritage 
through study of archaeology, history, literature and philosophy. The 
standard of living of both students and staff was low, and many staff left 
the sector in despair when private-sector economic reforms started to 
succeed in the mid to late 1980s; they were rapidly overtaken in terms of 
income and social status by uneducated entrepreneurs. In universities in 
Beijing and other cities there was considerable staff resentment of poor 
conditions and over-intrusive political controls. This dissatisfaction was 
a major element in student and lecturer participation in the massive 
demonstrations of 1989, which in turn led to more conciliatory policies 
in the next few years (Rai, 1991). 
Also from the 1980s, the Chinese government adopted a far-sighted 
policy of encouraging as many young people as possible to study 
overseas, especially in the USA, Japan and Europe, by providing 
government scholarships and encouraging private study abroad. From 
the mid-1990s, China realised the benefits of this policy by enticing back 
numerous overseas graduates, offering well-paid positions with excellent 
facilities at top Chinese universities. One spectacular success was the 
enticement of Andrew Chi-chih Yao, one of the USA’s leading computer 
scientists, from Princeton to Qinghua university in Beijing in 2004 
(French, 2005). 
A massive expansion of Chinese HE has been underway since 2000, 
reflecting the government’s ever-increasing investment funds and 
awareness of technological competition. Indeed it is perhaps the greatest 
rapid expansion of the sector globally in terms of building and facilities, 
numbers of students, quality of staff, and range of disciplines. Pay and 
reward structures are becoming increasingly commercialised, so 
productive staff can go shopping for positions at expanding universities, 
where they are rewarded by generous salary and housing packages; a 
downside – from many staff’s point of view – is a rigorous review of 
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outputs, in effect a publish-or-perish regime especially in prestige 
institutions. In addition, university life as a whole is becoming ever more 
funding driven, with the encouragement of all kinds of commercial joint 
ventures, corporate and civic investment, and exploration of new 
academic disciplines. 
A recent report suggests a quantitative and qualitative growth as 
follows: in 1990, the system was characterised by a large number of 
relatively small, youth-oriented, specialist universities and colleges 
enrolling a tiny proportion (about 2%) of the 18-22 age group. By 1997, a 
total of approximately 3.2 million students were enrolled in regular 
Higher Education (about 4% of the 18-22 age group), and numbers 
reached a staggering seven million by 2000 (about 10% of the cohort). 
Moreover in the 1990s, numerous adult education institutions and large 
distance learning institutions such as the China Central Radio & TV 
University were established and expanded. The Ministry of Education’s 
target, including adult and distance enrolments, was 16 million 
enrolments by 2010 (Observatory on Borderless Higher Education, 2003, 
p. 1). Naturally there are serious concerns about quality during this 
growth spurt, partly because different institutions were supervised by 
different units of national and municipal government departments and 
subject to different quality regimes. 
In recent years, the government has continued to promote education 
as critical to national economic success and has pursued a policy of 
institutional mergers and enhancement alongside the expansion of 
student numbers. Mention should be made of two specific national 
programmes, the 221 project and the 985 project. The first was a massive 
investment in the leading 100 universities across China, with the 
intention of ensuring international standards in a wide range of 
disciplines. This was complemented in 2005 by 985, a specialist 
investment programme in a handful of elite universities, evidently with 
the intention that they would start to rival US Ivy League and 
international institutions of similar standing. 
A report on foreign engagement in Chinese HE argues that ‘China is 
perhaps the world’s most over-hyped, under-analysed and complex 
market for transnational higher education’ (Observatory on Borderless 
Higher Education, 2003, p. 1). The major incentives for the PRC 
government to encourage direct foreign involvement with its HE 
provision are capacity, status and innovation. Chinese students probably 
outnumber any other nationality in the USA, Australia, the UK and 
several other tertiary ‘markets’; the Chinese urban population has a very 
high savings rate, and a major target of many, perhaps most, Chinese 
parents is to pay for the best possible education for their children or, 
more likely, for their one child (Story, 2003, p. 71). Until now, the 
Chinese authorities have been either actively supportive or at least not 
opposed to young people studying overseas, but the past several years’ 
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investment in Chinese Higher Education has probably had, among other 
motives, the intention to reduce the outflow of talent and cash. One way 
to retain the benefits of international education is to persuade foreign 
universities to set up programmes or even campuses in the PRC. As well 
as capacity, foreign universities can bring status, and quickly offer the 
latest international innovations in course content, technical training and 
other areas. Nevertheless, foreign universities have to face an uncertain, 
non-transparent legislative environment in the PRC, and joint ventures 
may be vulnerable to sudden shifts in government policy. 
Too often, the ‘partnership’ of Chinese and Western academia has 
meant the attraction of Chinese students and staff to Western institutions 
rather than more equitable, reciprocal relations. The reason for this 
imbalance is not obscure: commercially driven Western universities, like 
many in the UK and Australia, are hungry for fee income; research-
intensive institutions need top-ranking productive scholars; many 
institutions need teaching staff. The converse has not generally been the 
case. Few Westerners have studied in China, and very few speak Chinese 
to a standard where they could effectively work there. Also, until 
recently, Chinese universities could rarely pay sufficient salaries to 
attract foreign academics to work in China. This situation did in fact 
change around 2004, when a handful of leading Chinese institutions, 
mostly in Beijing, started to pay generous expatriate salaries and 
allowances for selected international faculty. 
Overall, the number of non-Chinese who have had significant direct 
input in China itself is thus limited; although of course Western 
academic output, especially when available in Chinese translation, is 
important to China’s intellectual life. Nevertheless, the international 
experience of Chinese scholars who have subsequently returned to China 
has without doubt been a tremendous boost to the current freedom of 
movement in the academic world within and beyond China’s borders. 
Similarly, while Western universities have, sometimes generously, 
contributed to the upgrading of Chinese academia, they have until 
recently been rather slow to consider the implications for Western 
curricula of China’s growing global influence. The situation is, however, 
changing. For example in 2006 the UK government announced a massive 
injection of funds into Asian Studies; while some innovative 
universities, for example the University of Technology of Sydney, now 
allow Chinese as an alternative language for doctoral programmes, and 
some European secondary schools offer Chinese as a standard foreign 
language option. 
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Case Study: a ‘higher education link’ in Peace  
Studies between Nanjing and Coventry universities 
To summarise the developments of the past decade, Chinese Higher 
Education has seen huge investment and expansion; internationalisation; 
commercialisation; devolution; and de-politicisation. Despite the gradual 
slackening of ideological controls, some disciplines remain politically 
sensitive, which raised the interesting question: would there be a place 
for Peace Studies in China, given the government’s commitment to a 
robust national defence policy, its suspicion of grass-roots activism, and 
Peace Studies’ links with ideologies of protest such as those of Gandhi or 
anti-war movements? 
The British Council HEL Programme funded numerous academic 
exchanges between the UK and China over a 20-year period from the 
mid-1980s, most of which focused on technical and scientific projects. 
Our Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies (CPRS) was recipient of 
an HEL grant for cooperation between Coventry and Nanjing universities 
from 2002 to 2005, in the discipline of Peace Studies. This award 
followed contacts between various staff members since 2000, when 
cooperation was formally established between the History Department of 
Nanjing University and the CPRS in Coventry. From 2002, one or two 
Chinese lecturers each year attended advanced studies on Peace Studies 
in Coventry; they usually stayed for about 10 weeks, auditing the first 
semester classes of Coventry’s MA in Peace and Reconciliation Studies 
programme, conducting library research, and doing fieldwork in other 
parts of the UK. In the same period, Coventry staff visited Nanjing, 
usually for 2-week periods during which they delivered lectures and 
seminars, and engaged with Chinese academic staff and students. 
I believe there were several factors that motivated our Chinese 
colleagues to engage in the link. One is the history of the city of Nanjing, 
the site of a horrific series of massacres of World War II, which started in 
1937 for the Chinese. The Japanese Imperial Army entered Nanjing, 
which was undefended, in autumn 1937 and initiated weeks of rape and 
murder which left an estimated 300,000 dead and many more 
traumatised. There is a disturbing commemorative museum in the city; 
almost all Nanjing families lost parents and grandparents. War, peace, 
and possibly in some cases reconciliation and memorialisation, are living 
issues in Nanjing. 
Another factor was the personal motivation of some of the key staff 
involved. For example Professor Qian Chengdan, our senior collaborator, 
is probably China’s best-known historian of Britain: he has an 
encyclopaedic knowledge of the long period of transition from absolute 
monarchy to parliamentary democracy. For him, there is an intellectually 
challenging parallel with Chinese evolution from Imperial days to the 
current ‘people’s democracy’ and beyond. Another example is Professor 
Liu Cheng, who has published one of China’s very few monographs on 
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the history and early ideology of the UK Labour Party, and serious 
articles on its recent foreign policy. I believe Professor Liu felt inspired 
and challenged to understand an alternative strand of idealistic thinking 
represented by thinkers in the Peace Studies tradition. Finally, it must 
have been quite an exciting, unconventional initiative for them and other 
colleagues to try to establish a brand new academic discipline within a 
Chinese institution. 
By 2005, the Chinese researchers had made a considerable 
contribution to promoting Peace Studies in the PRC: they published the 
first Chinese translations of key texts including Rigby’s Justice and 
Reconciliation After the Violence; Galtung’s Peace by Peaceful Means; 
Barash and Weber’s Peace Studies Reader and many articles. They also 
had papers and translations published in journals such as Foreign Social 
Science, Journal of Nanjing University and Xuehai (Academia Bimestris); 
four edited volumes of Peace Archives; and three Peace Studies courses 
for both undergraduate and postgraduate students in Nanjing University. 
In addition, Nanjing University began to recruit postgraduates and 
doctoral candidates on peace research in 2004, and a new undergraduate 
textbook by Liu Cheng, Hepingxue (Peace Studies), the first of its kind in 
China, was published in 2006. On the UK side, our programmes were 
enriched by the attendance of Chinese participants, and joint research 
led to the book Peace Studies in the Chinese Century (Hunter, 2006), a 
number of articles, and a joint presentation at the International Peace 
Research Association biennial conference in 2006. 
Apart from the training and research outcomes, the two universities 
co-hosted an International Conference on Peace Studies in Nanjing in 
March 2005. As a formal start-up for peace research in China, the 
conference received wide coverage and allowed more Chinese academics 
to understand the implications of Peace Studies, enormously advancing 
teaching and research in the area. Some 40 Chinese academics attended, 
including well-known figures such as Professor Zhu Xueqing from 
Shanghai University, alongside representatives from Chinese and 
international NGOs, and a dozen non-Chinese scholars. The latter 
included some of the best-known names in Peace Studies such as Johan 
Galtung and Stuart Rees, Director of the Sydney Peace Prize Foundation. 
Conference proceedings ranged from presentation of Chinese intellectual 
resources for considering peace in the Confucian tradition, to studies of 
contemporary issues in Latin America and South Africa. 
Two objectives of the HEL Programme were capacity building and 
promotion of gender equality. It was probably in these two areas that our 
particular partnership was least effective. With regard to capacity 
building, Peace Studies still faces serious challenges in China, and 
probably the senior administration of Nanjing University saw little 
prospect of diverting a higher level of resources to this new and 
unproved discipline. Likewise, gender balance remained an issue 
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throughout the Programme. Of the three key staff involved in Coventry, 
two were men; and of all staff involved in Nanjing, only one was female 
as were the majority of conference participants. I believe the gender 
imbalance stems more from the disproportionate number of male staff 
overall in closely related disciplines in China, such as international 
relations, rather than specific obstacles against women’s participation in 
this particular initiative. However, it would be useful to see a statistical 
and qualitative gender analysis of educational and career choices among 
young Chinese academics. 
Peace researchers, and those interested in a more peaceful society 
generally, have sensitive issues to handle in the PRC. On the other hand, 
many Chinese are very expert in negotiating official sensitivities, 
understanding what is more or less tolerated and what is a step too far in 
areas like environmental protests, or investigation into corruption. At 
present, our experience is that the university administrators and 
ministries would certainly tolerate, and probably warmly welcome, 
many aspects of Peace Studies, such as research into historical processes 
of change, causes of war and transitions to peace, peace building, 
international aid issues and so on. It is a truism that many Chinese, 
perhaps almost all educated Chinese, have a deep respect for history, and 
regard for lessons from the past, including lessons from conflicts. In a 
celebrated episode in 2005, one of our leading collaborators in China, 
Professor Qian mentioned above, was invited to give seminars to China’s 
top political leadership including President Jiang Zemin, on the British 
experience of peaceful transition from monarchy to democracy. Part of 
the seminar was even shown on national TV, a clear message that the 
CCP leadership is somehow, some day, committed to political transition, 
but it wants to do so with preparation and avoiding mistakes made in the 
former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
The CCP leadership is necessarily committed to peace in at least 
two dimensions. First, it is well aware of the massive technological lead 
that the USA has in military affairs. Possibly the key guiding factor in 
Chinese foreign policy is to avoid military confrontation with the USA; 
while at the same time, it wants to assert its right to be a global power. 
Second, there are massive social problems in both rural and urban areas 
arising from income disparities, corruption, environmental degradation 
and other causes. Until 2006, in the context of unprecedented economic 
growth, the government managed to more or less constrain protests 
within limits, without excessive use of force. Many think further rounds 
of mass demonstration are imminent. Yet the CCP is no longer simply a 
brutal dictatorial regime ready and willing to deport or kill off protesters, 
although it might do so in extreme circumstances; the Chinese public is 
now much more self-confident than in earlier decades, and also the 
leadership is ever more sensitive to international public opinion. It has 
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to make every effort to negotiate a whole series of accommodations with 
a very diverse population. 
HEIs definitely have a central role in the education of Chinese 
leadership. The top dozen universities still provide a large number of 
graduates who proceed directly to a career in civil service and political 
institutions. Fast-track is available especially for young people who 
attend the major Beijing universities. Moreover, a number of research 
institutes, think-tanks, and university faculty contribute to seminars and 
publications for the benefit of political decision-makers on a wide range 
of domestic and international issues. In short, the central political 
leadership is itself educated within, and continuously updated by, the 
HE sector, with a bias towards Beijing-based institutions. But the process 
also operates at a more local level. Provincial officials have already 
attended training courses in conflict resolution organised by Peace 
Studies staff at Nanjing University for example. 
How will peace or conflict affect the achievement of MDGs in China 
and thus to the goals of lifting people out of poverty and ensuring access 
to health and education? As far as we know, the Chinese government is 
optimistic of attaining all or most MDGs within about 10 years (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, 2006). Admittedly that 
is the official aspiration, but it is one that is accepted, at least in the area 
of poverty reduction, by independent analysts from the World Bank 
Development Research Group Poverty Team (Ravallion & Chen, 2004). 
Two major threats to what would be an amazing success are first, the 
ever-present risk of military conflict, in which the USA or Japan would 
be the most destructive opponents, and an alliance between them the 
greatest possible risk to China. The second would be massive, violent 
social unrest which could perhaps destabilise society, for which the most 
probable cause would be extreme dislocation following environmental 
and energy collapse. If Peace Studies is able to gain a footing in key 
university faculties or research centres, as discussed above, it could 
perhaps contribute to better conflict management. I think this would be a 
great achievement. We may not expect the next generation of Chinese 
leaders to be pacifists, by any means, but at least we might hope that 
some of them have an awareness of pro-peace discourse, an 
understanding of non-military solutions to complex problems. If the next 
generation of Western leaders were to gain similar insights, it would be 
even better. 
Conclusion: lessons learned from a higher education link 
Peace Studies as a discipline has evolved as a trans-disciplinary, 
innovative area of academic life depending on its political and social 
contexts; and its Chinese evolution will be no exception. It faces some 
difficulties. First, until now Peace Studies has not had any specialist 
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research organisation or academic major in any Chinese university. 
Although Nanjing University has tried to build up a special centre for 
peace research, the final decision is still in question, as is its funding. 
Second, another problem is whether or not Peace Studies can obtain full 
recognition from wider academic circles. China suffered a century of 
humiliation by foreign powers, ‘being beaten for lagging behind’ as the 
expression goes. Many academics may believe that Peace Studies only 
states some ideals, but does not offer any achievable reality in a fiercely 
competitive world. Third, in a developing country like China, graduates 
majoring in Peace Studies soon encounter the fierce realities of the job 
market, where they may suffer compared to those with qualifications in 
information technology, management or engineering. 
Peace Studies in the West, for example in the 1960s and 1970s, was 
mostly oriented towards pressurising our own governments in the field 
of international politics: to de-escalate the arms race, to abolish nuclear 
weapons, to support war resisters. A secondary orientation was to preach 
pacifism as a near-absolute commitment, often supported by alternative 
life-styles. ‘As important as campaigning and demonstrating against 
particular wars was the creative and constructive task of articulating a 
vision’ as one participant put it (Rigby, 2006, p. 127). By the 1990s, 
different priorities were apparent: a focus on ethnicity and sub-state 
wars, for example, and a closer connection with environmental and 
developmental issues. 
As the discipline evolves in China, and more broadly by observing 
Chinese society in the coming decades, we will have much to learn. Any 
Chinese leadership will have to cope with the multiple stresses caused 
by rapid modernisation, which will surely intensify in the event of any 
downturn in the economy. These stresses will be much worse if the 
country suffers acutely from climate change and aggravation of 
environmental damage. Meanwhile, it will have to continue to 
aggressively seek energy and raw materials on the world market, to 
resolve disputes with Western powers, and to maintain its strategic 
position in the Asia-Pacific region. I am sure that careful observation will 
reveal much that is useful as well as, doubtless, serious errors. Overall, I 
see every reason to hope for a productive and positive exchange of 
cultural resources between China and the West, and hope that 
commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts can play an important 
part in this process. 
I would like to conclude with three observations. First, I found the 
HEL concept and administration was well suited to the establishment of 
this small-scale academic partnership. I also mostly welcome its 
extension into the Development Partnerships in Higher Education 
programme stream of funding, especially the latter’s support for larger-
scale projects and the greater autonomy for partner institutions in 
developing countries. I was, however, a little concerned that its very 
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explicit focus on a designated area of poverty reduction may be turn out 
to be too restrictive. For example in a country like China, there is 
evidently scope for further poverty reduction, but the UK Department for 
International Development itself recognises that non-Chinese agencies 
will have an extremely marginal role in that process compared to the vast 
scale of national programmes. For overall social improvement, China 
would probably benefit from innovations in natural or social sciences, or 
technology, as much as from restricted interventions in poverty 
reduction. Second, we came to appreciate that Chinese scholars, 
university administrators, publishers, local officials and others are open 
to new ideas. Some were quick to grasp that non-Chinese approaches to 
peace and conflict management, which before our programme were 
virtually unknown in the PRC, were worth studying, perhaps comparing 
with indigenous traditions. They were also alert to possible links 
between conflict and poverty, an understanding that hopefully is also 
reflected in UK official thinking so that poverty reduction strategies all 
explicitly incorporate conflict reduction also. 
Third, participation in this link programme was a significant and 
rewarding experience for all the UK staff and students involved. It is easy 
enough through short visits to gain a superficial view of the startling 
progress being made in China generally, reflected for example in the new 
buildings and facilities available on university campuses. But by longer 
term association one comes to understand some of the background and 
complexities also: how our colleagues’ lives have changed, how the past 
lives on in the present, their aspirations for the coming generation and so 
on. The PRC has already become the fourth or fifth largest economy in 
the world and is set to become the second within a generation. I am 
convinced that one of the major challenges for those of us who live 
alongside this process is to engage in cooperative programmes to ensure 
a deep, mutually beneficial and productive relationship. 
References 
Altbach, Philip G. & Umakoshi, Toru (2004) Asian Universities: historical 
perspectives and contemporary challenges. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Allan, Sarah (1997) The Way of Water and Sprouts of Virtue. Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 
Brauch, Hans Günter (2005) Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks in 
Environmental and Human Security, in Studies of the University: research, 
counsel, education. Bonn: United Nations University Institute for 
Environment and Human Security. 
Commission for Africa (2005) Our Common Interest: report of the Commission 
for Africa. London: Commission for Africa. 
Alan Hunter 
228 
Cox, Caroline & Scruton, Roger (1984) Peace Studies: a critical survey. New York: 
Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies. 
French, Howard (2005) China Luring Scholars to Make Universities Great, New 
York Times, 28 October. 
Galtung, Johan (1975) Essays in Peace Research. 5 vols. Copenhagen: Ejlers. 
Galtung, Johan (1996) Peace by Peaceful Means: peace and conflict, development 
and civilization. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. 
Galtung, Johan (2006) Peace Studies: a ten points primer, in A. Hunter (Ed.) 
Peace Studies in the Chinese Century. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Hartnett, Richard A. (1998) The Saga of Chinese Higher Education from the 
Tongzhi Restoration to Tiananmen Square: revolution and reform. Lewiston: 
E. Mellen Press. 
Hayhoe, Ruth (1989) China’s Universities and the Open Door. Armonk: 
M.E. Sharpe. 
Hunter, Alan (Ed.) (2006) Peace Studies in the Chinese Century: international 
perspectives. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Hunter, Alan & Liu, Cheng (2007) China and the New International Security 
Agenda, in H.G. Brauch (Ed.) New Conceptualizations of Security. Berlin: 
Springer.  
Lin, Min & Galikowski, Maria (1999) The Search for Modernity: Chinese 
intellectuals and cultural discourse in the post-Mao era. New York: St 
Martin’s Press. 
Mack, Andrew & Nielsen, Zoe (2006) Human Security Report 2005. Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China (2006) China’s Progress 
Towards Millennium Development Goals. Beijing: Department of 
International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Newman, Edward & Richmond, Oliver P. (2001) The United Nations and Human 
Security. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Observatory on Borderless Higher Education (2003) Higher Education in China: 
Part 1: Context and Regulation of Foreign Activity. London: International 
Strategic Information Service. 
Oswald, Ursula (2006) Latin American Perspectives on Peace Research, in 
A. Hunter (Ed.) Peace Studies in the Chinese Century. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Pepper, Suzanne (1984) China’s Universities: post-Mao enrollment policies and 
their impact on the structure of secondary education: a research report, 
Michigan Monographs in Chinese Studies, No. 46. Ann Arbor: Center for 
Chinese Studies, University of Michigan. 
Rai, Shirin (1991) Resistance and Reaction: university politics in post-Mao 
China. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Rank, Carol (2006) The Development of Peace Studies in the United, in A. Hunter 
(Ed.) Peace Studies in the Chinese Century. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
PEACE STUDIES IN CHINESE HIGHER EDUCATION 
229 
Ravallion, Martin & Chen, Shaohua (2004) China’s Uneven Progress against 
Poverty. Washington: World Bank Development Research Group Poverty 
Team. 
Rigby, Andrew (2006) Peace Studies in the UK: a personal reflection, in 
A. Hunter (Ed.) Peace Studies in the Chinese Century. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Ryden, Edmund (1998) Philosophy of Peace in Han China. Taipei: Taipei Ricci 
Institute. 
Saul, Ben (2006) The Dangers of the United Nations’ ‘New Security Agenda’: 
‘human security’ in the Asia-Pacific Region, Asian Journal of Comparative 
Law, 1(1). http://www.bepress.com/asjcl/vol1/iss1/art10 
Shenkar, Oded (2004) The Chinese Century: the rising Chinese economy and its 
impact on the global economy, the balance of power, and your job. 
Philadelphia: Wharton School Publishing. 
Stephenson, Carolyn (1989) The Evolution of Peace Studies, in D. Thomas & 
M. Klare (Eds) Peace and World Order Studies: a curriculum guide. Boulder: 
Westview Press. 
Story, J. (2003) China: the race to market. Edinburgh: FT/Prentice Hall. 
Terrill, Ross (2003) The New Chinese Empire: and what it means for the United 
States. New York: Basic Books. 
United Nations Commission on Human Security (2003) Human Security Now. 
New York: United Nations. 
United Nations Development Programme (1990-) Human Development Report. 
New York: Oxford University Press for the UNDP. 
Wadhwa, Vivek (2006) Testimony of Vivek Wadhwa to the US House of 
Representatives Committee on Education and Workforce. 
http://www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/051606_Testimony_of_Vivek_Wadhwa.pdf 
Yang, Deguang & Liu, Yan (1988) Gaodeng jiaoyu fazhan zhanlue yanjiu 
[Research on the strategic development of Higher Education]. Shanghai: 
Shanghai Jiaotong daxue chubanshe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alan Hunter 
230 
 
 
 
 
 
